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VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW. By.James B. 
Atleson. Amherst, Mass.: University of Massachusetts Press. 1983. 
Pp. x, 240. Cloth, $25; paper $12. 
Supreme Court interpretation of the National Labor Relations 
Act (NLRA) has resulted in a morass of seemingly contradictory 
doctrines and decisions. According to James Atleson,1 the Court's 
decisions appear inconsistent or even irrational because commenta-
tors wrongly analyze them under the notion that judicial decisions 
are based on consideration of the rational implications of statutory 
policy. Atleson claims that labor law doctrine can best be explained 
by the presence of underlying "assumptions and values about the 
economic system and the prerogatives of capital, and corollary as-
sumptions about the rights and obligations of employees . . ." (p. 
10), all of which consistently influence judicial decisionmaking. 
Values and Assumptions in American Labor Law :fits neatly into 
the four elements of the Conference on Critical Legal Studies as de-
fined by David Kairys in The Politics of Law: A Progressive Cri-
tique .2 The first element is a rejection of the idealized model that a 
distinctly legal mode of reasoning characterizes the legal process. 
Social and political judgments, rather than legal analysis, guide legal 
choices. Second, the "Critical Legal School" stresses democracy and 
an accompanying shift away from private rights, most notably in the 
corporate economic sphere. Third, the view of the law as neutral 
and value free is rejected as a myth. Finally, the law is seen as a 
legitimating tool for society's dominant value system. Atleson's 
book may be the most thorough treatment of labor law by a propo-
nent of the "critical labor jurisprudence,''3 but his conclusions flow 
naturally from the principles enunciated by Kairys. 
The crux of Atleson's work appears in his Introduction, where he 
seeks to articulate the five unstated assumptions that underlie labor 
law doctrine. First, legal decisionmaking is guided by the need to 
maintain continuity of production (p. 7). Second, courts assume that 
employees will behave irresponsibly unless controlled (p. 7). Third, 
courts view the workers as a relatively minor part of a business and 
as people who owe a certain degree ofloyalty to their employers (pp. 
I. Professor Atleson is currently a professor of law at the State University of New York, 
Buffalo. 
2. Kairys, Introduction, in THE PoLmcs OF LAW 3-6 (D. Kairys ed. 1982) (reviewed in this 
issue). For the view that Kairys' formulation oversimplifies a heterogeneous movement, see 
Levinson, Book Review, 96 HAR.v. L. Rev. 1466 (1983) (reviewing THE Pouncs OF LAW, 
supra). See also Klare, Colloquium Response, 11 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. CHANGE 118, 120 
(1983) (identifying Atleson as one of the writers in the developing "critical labor jurispru-
dence" while commenting on Atleson, Management Prerogatives, Plant Closings and the 
NLRA, 11 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. CHANGE 83 (1983)). 
3. For a list of other critical labor writings, see Klare, Labor Law as Ideology: Toward a 
New Historiography of Collective Bargaining Law, 4 INDUS. REL. L.J. 450, 450 n.l (1981). 
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8-9). Fourth, the business enterprise is seen as the property of man-
agement and thus as something that should be under exclusive man-
agement control (p. 8). Finally, courts implicitly recognize an 
employer's right to manage, which takes precedence over industrial 
democracy (p. 8). The Court has adhered to these assumptions de-
spite the 1935 passage of the NLRA, which in Atleson's view was 
intended to work a radical shift away from the pre-eminence of capi-
tal and toward industrial democracy. 
The remainder of Values and Assumptions in American Labor 
Law applies the theory enunciated in the introduction. Atleson am-
bitiously takes on a broad spectrum of labor-management issues in 
an attempt to demonstrate that the five assumptions permeate the 
entire field of labor law. The book's brevity prevents the author 
from dealing in depth with any of the numerous issues that he raises, 
but considerable time is devoted to certain cases that Atleson cites as 
egregious examples of judicial modification of the values underlying 
the NLRA. The most important of these are the decisions in NLRB 
v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co. 4 and Textile Workers Union v . 
.Darlington Manefacturing5 Because these decisions are weak in 
terms of statutory support, Atleson can rely on them to show an ab-
sence of legal reasoning. These two cases, along with approximately 
a dozen others that are examined at length, support the theory that 
Atleson has developed. 
They do not, however, constitute a sufficiently extensive cross-
section of labor law to support the conclusion that most major deci-
sions are aberrations from the usual process of legal reasoning (p. 
170). For example, a notable exclusion from Atleson's discussion is 
the "Steelworker's Trilogy."6 This trio of cases established the na-
tional policy in favor of arbitration, thus demonstrating the Court's 
willingness to defer to the bargaining process instead of intervening. 
If the courts have traditionally protected the preeminence of capital, 
the abandonment of this function to allow arbitration can be viewed 
as an important shift: Rather than preserve "management preroga-
tives," the Court made them subject to arbitration. 
Atleson's thesis that judicial decisions constitute the "construing 
and constructing of status or contractual relationships" (p. 171 ), at 
the expense of the NLRA's alteration of these relationships, turns on 
the notion that the NLRA marked a radical change from pre-1935 
4. 304 U.S. 333 (1938) (providing that an employer, while not able to discharge striking 
employees, can hire permanent replacements). In Atleson's view, this case circumvented the 
right to strike guaranteed by § 7 of the NLRA. 
5. 380 U.S. 263 (1965) (demonstrating the preeminence of capital by allowing an owner to 
close his plant for anti-union reasons as a prerogative of capital). 
6. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United 
Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise 
Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960). 
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labor law. While the NLRA was certainly a watershed, it is not clear 
that the Act was designed to alter extensively pre-1935 notions about 
the preeminence of capital. To show that the NLRA was intended to 
work a fundamental change in the labor-management balance of 
power, Atleson points to the broad language of sections 7 and 8(a) of 
the Act. Specifically, Atleson notes that the Act does not mandate 
that the relative interests and power of labor and management be 
balanced, although the courts have undertaken to do so (p. 24). This 
point is true but does not necessarily support Atleson's assertion that 
the NLRA was intended to alterfundamentally the relative strength 
of labor and management. Congress' concern for limiting the rela-
tive power of labor unions can be viewed as support for judicial bal-
ancing of interests and a mandate for some protection of managerial 
prerogatives. A further weakness in Atleson's argument is the lack 
of any systematic discussion of the Taft-Hartley amendments to the 
NLRA. In reading Atleson's analysis, one cannot help but feel that 
his major concern is not that courts are being guided by values and 
assumptions but that the values and assumptions being used are not 
his. 
Despite these shortcomings, Values and Assumptions in American 
Labor Law is a well-written and interesting work. Atleson's analysis, 
particularly with respect to the cases he has selected, is valid. How-
ever, the book's contribution to legal scholarship is limited. First, it 
is not surprising that courts reflect the values of a society that has 
traditionally stressed the preeminence of capital. Nor is it terribly 
surprising that court interpretations of the NLRA have not shifted 
these values radically in favor of industrial democracy, particularly 
when it is not clear that the Act was intended to accomplish such a 
result. The primary value of Atleson's work lies in its unmasking of 
the "myth of legal reasoning." In this sense, Values and Assumptions 
in American Labor Law is a detailed extension of the work of the 
Conference on Critical Legal Studies. 
Second, like many critical legal scholars, Atleson fails to provide 
an alternative to existing implicit values. 
Radicals too often think that once they have exposed the politics un-
derlying the existing order, they have accomplished worthwhile analy-
sis. Perceptive analysis is important, but stating the truth is not always 
profound. . . . Of greater interest, though, would be a discussion of 
how political struggle might be better conducted and result in better 
ends than a satisfaction of private property. 7 
Values and Assumptions in American Labor Law is a well-written 
application of critical legal jurisprudence to labor law. Unfortu:. 
7. Bachmann & Weltchek, Book Review, 30 UCLA L. REv. 1078, 1091 (1983) (reviewing 
THE PoLmcs OF LAW, supra note 2). For similar arguments, see Levinson, supra note 2. 
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nately, Atleson's work offers little more than application; the book 
contributes no new theories, frameworks, or solutions that cannot be 
derived from previous critical legal work. 
